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Abstract 
 
The existence of parallel economies that operate in the shadows of informality within most Latin 
American countries is widely recognized by the economic literature. However, its composition, size 
and effects on economic growth are still open questions.  In this paper, we estimate the size and the 
evolution of the Mexican informal economy in the last three decades using a vector error correction 
model. In addition to the standard explanatory variables traditionally used in the currency demand 
approach, we include remittances given their relevance in the Mexican economic system. The 
results indicate that informality prior to the late 1980’s accounted for at least two thirds of GDP, 
while stabilizing around one third of GDP in the last decade. Furthermore, our estimates provide 
evidence of a positive long run relationship between informality and economic growth.  
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 3 
A.  Introduction 
 
Economies in most of the developing world are characterized by huge informal sectors. In a 
globalized world dominated by immense economic flows, understanding the causes, the size and the 
effects of these phenomena represents a priority in the economic literature. Although the problem of 
informality is not new, an agreement on a unique unanimously accepted definition, a 
comprehensive theoretical model as well as a clear measuring method are still missing. This  
confirms the difficulty posed by a phenomenon that operates in the shadows of illegality and whose 
causes and resources vary among countries. From now on, we will refer to informality as all the 
income generating activities that are unregulated by institutions
2
. One of the first authors that 
analysed informality in the developing world was De Soto (1989), who studied the informal sector 
in Peru, giving insights and evidence on the development and interactions of Peru’s underground 
economy. However, the first rigorous treatment can be tracked back to Loayza (1997), who used an 
AK endogenous growth model to study informality causes, and the multiple indicators multiple 
causes method (MIMIC) to measure the size of  informality in Latin America. Unfortunately,  
estimates of the informal sector are done using cross section analysis that study short periods of 
time, thus precluding us from capturing its evolution over time and reaction to economic shocks. In 
this paper, we will focus on measuring the size and evolution of informality in Mexico, in order to 
contribute to the understanding of the interactions and effects of the underground economy not 
observable in previous regional studies. 
 
The Mexican economy, as the rest of Latin America, has always been characterized by a parallel 
economy. Street vendors and their micro businesses, known as “vendedores ambulantes”, plague 
huge areas of all the major urban centres in the country. These irregular economic agents form part 
of the daily reality of the Mexican life. Far from what could be thought, they are well organized and 
are under the protection of specific groups in charge of negotiating with, or bribing the authorities. 
Their presence is a source of discontent and negative externalities to the formal establishment that 
continuously lobby for their removal. Informality distorts prices and forces wages below its 
optimum equilibrium
3
, giving to formal, national or foreign economic agents the perception of an 
institutional void, that could have long run consequences for the economy. 
 
As Roubaud (1995) pointed out, economic agents react to economic shocks adopting new survival 
strategies. In the case of Mexico, and probably the rest of Latin America, these new survival 
strategies include the establishment of micro businesses in the shadow of the informal sector. 
Employment in this sector appears as a natural alternative to cope with sharp decreases in income, 
high unemployment rates, continuous economic crisis and adverse business regulations.  
 
In this context, measuring the size of the Mexican informal sector becomes relevant, since it 
certainly affects the macroeconomy and development of the country. Its magnitude and  effects on 
growth (positive or negative relationship) are still open questions in the literature
4
.   
 
The Mexican authorities are aware of this; so, the Mexican National Statistics Institute (INEGI)  
 
                                                 
2
 See Portes et al. (1989), and Portes and Haller (2005). 
 
3
 See IMF (2005) Country Report on Mexico-Selected Issues. 
 
4
 Previous empirical studies have found contradictory evidence on the relationship between informality and growth. On 
one hand, Helderberg and Knepel (1988), Loayza (1997), and Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996), among others, find a 
negative relation. On the other hand, Tedds (1998), Giles and Tedds (2002) and more recently Chaudhuri et al. (2006)  
find a positive impact of informality on growth.  
 4 
conducts surveys in an attempt to measure the quantity of agents that work in the informal sector
5
. 
The surveys indicate that almost 30 percent of the Economic Active Population (EAP) is engaged in 
the underground economy. Empirical estimates by Schneider (2002) and Vuletin (2006) attribute a 
size of 33.2 and 28.2 percent of GDP respectively to the informal sector. Unfortunately, these 
estimates refer to the late 1990’s early 2000’s, and are usually point estimates, precluding their use 
to analyse in deep the phenomenon and its possible evolution over time. Therefore, we decided to 
estimate a specific informal sector time series for the Mexican economy. In order to do so, we used 
the “classic” currency demand approach, going back in time as much as the data constraints allowed 
us.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section B, we provide a brief description of the 
currency demand approach. Section C briefly summarizes the data and methodology. In section D, 
we present our results for the vector error correction model (VEC). Next, we used the VEC 
estimates to compute the size of the informal sector in Mexico. The procedure and the results are 
summarized in section E. Furthermore, in Section F we use the estimated time series for the 
informal sector to analyse its relationship with economic growth, and, finally, in Section G we offer 
some final remarks and policy recommendations. 
 
 
 
B.  The Currency Demand Approach 
 
Before jumping into the technicalities of the currency demand approach, we will describe briefly 
the whole set of techniques available in the literature to measure informality. We can classify them 
into three categories
6
: 
 
 
(1) Direct Methods: these methods refer usually to public or private surveys
7
 and target 
directly potential informal workers in an attempt to quantify participation into the 
underground economy. 
 
(2) Indirect Methods: these methods use discrepancies in official records (differences 
between official and actual labour force, discrepancies between national income and 
consumption, different monetary methods, etc.) as proxies of the size of the informal sector.
8
  
 
(3) MIMIC or Model Approach: although this approach seems to belong to the indirect 
methodology, it differs from the previous methods, since it is able to link unobserved 
variables to observed indicators, using structural equations that model causal relationships 
among the unobserved variables
9
. 
 
                                                 
5
 The survey started in 2000 and annual averages are available in the Appendix. 
 
6
 See Schneider (2002) for a detailed description. 
 
7
 In Mexico, these type of surveys are conducted by the National Statistics Institute (INEGI), while surveys covering a 
wider sample of countries are conducted by the International Labour Organization (ILO). 
 
8
 Examples of these methods can be found in Kauffman and Kaliberda (1996), and Tanzi (1983). 
 
9
 The use of the MIMIC approach for estimation of the informal sector was first introduced by Frey and Weck-
Hanneman (1984). 
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The currency demand approach can be classified among the indirect methods. This approach has 
been widely used in the past decades to estimate informality mainly in  developed countries
10
.  
 
The family of monetary methods dates back to Cagan (1958), Gutmann (1977) and Feige (1979), 
but it was Tanzi (1983) that made the currency demand approach very popular among economists. 
The main assumption supporting this type of approach is that transactions in the informal sector use 
mostly cash, in order to maintain their activities in the shadows, away from any kind of formal 
record. So, if we could estimate the amount of cash used for informal transactions, we should be 
able to infer the size of the informal sector in the economy. 
 
The idea behind the currency demand methods used in the literature is well summarized in a recent 
critical assessment by Ahumada, Alvarado and Canavese (2006). Following their work, a typical 
Cagan (1958) type currency demand function can be written as: 
 
 
         )exp()1( 00 iYAC 
                                                            (1) 
 
 
where C0  stands for observed cash and Θ represents the variable that gives incentives to make 
hidden transactions. This is the key variable behind all currency models
11
. Traditionally this 
incentive variable has been approximated using government consumption normalized by GDP, tax 
rates (direct taxes, indirect taxes, etc.) or tax revenues to GDP. An increase in Θ is expected to have 
a positive impact on currency demand, since agents will have more incentives to go to the informal 
sector, demanding more currency for their transactions. Y0 is the registered GDP. This variable 
approximates the level of transactions in the economy. Alternative measures are GDP per capita or 
consumption per capita. Finally, i is the interest rate and A, α, β, γ represent positive parameters.  
 
Estimating equation (1), we obtain Cˆ . Setting the incentive variable Θ to zero, and leaving the 
coefficients of the other variables unchanged, we get C
~
.  The difference between Cˆ  and C
~
 allows 
us to estimate extra currency, i.e. the amount of currency holdings that are tax induced. In other 
words, the difference measures the amount of illegal money in the economy. Now, assuming that 
the velocity of money
12
 is the same in both the formal and informal sector
13
, we can obtain an 
estimate of the size of the informal economy multiplying illegal money ( Cˆ - C
~
) by the velocity of 
money ( v = Y/C ). 
 
                                                 
10
 See Shima (2004) for Norway; Tanzi (1983) for USA; Klovland (1984) for Norway and Sweden; Bovi and 
Castellucci (2001) for Italy; Bovi and Dell’Anno (2007) for OECD countries. 
 
11
 Some of the critics to this type of approach refer precisely to the use of taxes as the only incentive for informality, 
claiming that not all underground activities are due to taxes, so the estimates obtained using the currency method are not 
able to capture the real level of informality. 
 
12
 This assumption is quite reasonable in the Mexican context. According to the “Comision Nacional Bancaria y de 
Valores” (CNBV,) credit cards remain largely an untapped market, and in 2005 Mexicans used cash for more than 86 
percent of their transactions. Furthermore,  Mexico underwent the privatization of its banking system during the late 
1990’s and the entrance of foreign banks during the early 2000’s; nevertheless, private saving decreased. See Bulíř and 
Swiston (2006). 
 
13
 This assumption has been criticized and, as Ahumada et al. (2006) claim, even if the velocity is the same, previous 
works that find β≠1 (i.e. income elasticity different from 1) are incorrect. Therefore, they propose an alternative way of 
correcting the estimates.  
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 C.   Methodology and Data 
 
This study uses annual data series that cover a period from 1970 to 2006. The main sources used to 
collect the data are: the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators, the Mexican Central Bank (online) database and the Mexican National 
Statistics Institute (INEGI). A more exhaustive description of the variables and their sources is 
provided in the Appendix. 
 
As pointed out by Guissarri (1987), one of the first decisions to be taken in a currency demand 
model is how to deflate the currency series. In the classical approach popularized by Tanzi (1983), 
the standard procedure imposes currency deflation using M2
14
. However, this assumption was 
widely criticized. Spiro (1996) claims that the use of M2 is inadequate, since it contains amounts 
that correspond to long-term wealth accumulation, while currency is used mainly for transaction 
processes. Refinements went on and, nowadays, economists studying the informal sector use 
currency and currency per capita in real terms (see Schneider and Enste, 2000, and Öğǘnç and 
Yilmaz, 2000). So, we decided to deflate our series using the national GDP deflator and, in order to 
capture the long run relationships of the explanatory variables on currency demand, we set up the 
following model
15
: 
 
tttttt REMRTAXYC   43210                                           (2) 
where: 
 
 C corresponds to the natural logarithm of currency in circulation outside the banks 
normalized by the GDP deflator; 
 Y is the log of GDP in real terms; 
 TAX represents the log of total tax revenues normalized by GDP; 
 R refers to the log of  the simple average of existing nominal interest rates; 
 REM  indicates the log of the amount of remittances received normalized by GDP. 
 υ is the error term. 
 
The above specification captures the long-run 
relationships between the explanatory variables 
and the currency demand. Note that in addition 
to the standard independent variables, we 
decided to include remittances. With 
globalization and massive migrations to the 
developed world, remittances magnitude has 
surpassed the one of foreign direct investment in 
many developing countries, prompting a peak of 
interest on their economic implications and their 
role in the long-run. The text figure plots the 
evolution of FDI and remittances in Mexico 
during the past three decades. Although modest  
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Sources: World Development Indicators (World Bank) and Banxico. 
Notes: Both series are in Billions of US dollars 
during the 1970’s, remittances have grown almost exponentially in the past twenty years, gaining 
weight in the Mexican economic scenario. Indeed, according to the World Bank (2006), remittances 
                                                 
14
 Tanzi (1983) estimated the following equation: Ln(C/M2) = a0 + a1 Ln T + a2 Ln (WS / NI) + a3 Ln R + a4 Ln Y + e, 
where C/M2 is the ratio of currency holdings to money, T is a tax variable, WS/NI is the ratio of wages and salaries in 
national income, R is a time deposit interest rate and Y is the real per capita income. 
 
15
 The model can be interpreted as a log-linearization of equation (1). 
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in 2003 were the nation’s second largest source of external finance after oil revenues16 (see text 
figure), surpassing traditional flows as foreign direct investment (FDI) and tourism revenues. 
Remittances are expected to have a positive impact on currency demand, especially because they 
enter the country in the form of money orders or as foreign currency (mainly U.S. dollars) in the 
pockets of migrant workers. It is important to point out that the series that we are using correspond 
to “recorded” remittances, which can be seen as a lower bound, since the actual amount is much 
more above. The World Bank’s estimates indicate that the actual amount of remittances could be 50 
percent higher
17
. 
 
Oil Revenues vs. Remittances as % of Total Government Revenues 
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Sources: World Development Indicators (World Bank) and Banxico. 
Notes: Data is presented as percentages of Total Government Revenues 
Another reason to include remittances as an 
explanatory variable has to do directly with 
informality. Although the former have not been 
totally associated with money laundry, it is 
well recognized that migrant workers usually 
engage in what is known as “smurfing” 
─separating transfers into smaller packages or 
different accounts, in order to avoid reporting 
and fulfilling local requirements such as 
taxation on larger amounts─ giving birth to 
different kinds of informal flows
18
. The 
opaqueness of these channels restraints in deep 
analysis. However, although the Mexican  
economy is closely link to the U.S. dollar, local transactions are made mostly using the national 
currency. So, migrant workers or their families are forced in one way or another to convert (using 
formal or informal channels) their dollars into Mexican pesos, thus increasing the demand for 
currency. 
 
Summarizing, we expect a positive impact on currency demand for GDP, taxes and remittances ( β1, 
β2, β4 >0 ), since an increase in these variables will put pressure on currency demand
19
. On the other 
hand, interest rate increases are expected to have a negative effect, prompting economic agents to 
get ride of their currency holdings ( β3 <0).  
 
Before proceeding with the estimation, we tested our series for the presence of unit roots and 
cointegration
20
 in our main specification. All series turn out to be strongly non-stationary and 
integrated of order 1. Trace tests on one hand indicate two cointegrating equations at the 5 percent 
level and one at the 1 percent level, while the eigenvalue test indicates one cointegrating equation at 
the 1 percent level. This allows us to conclude that there exists one cointegration relationship
21
.  
                                                 
16
 According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), in 2004 Mexico ranked number five as one of the top oil 
producers of the world. For more details see  www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/ . 
 
17
 See World Bank (2006), p. xiii and p. 85. and OECD (2007a), chapter 6. 
 
18
 We refer interested readers to a special report from the World Bank by Hernandez-Coss (2005) dealing with the U.S.-
Mexico remittances corridor.  
 
19
 Note that the positive impact of taxes on currency demand can be  interpreted in Tanzi’s spirit as follows:  
as the level of taxation rises, economic agents will be encouraged to engage tax-evading activities, that are facilitated by 
the use of currency, due to the intractability of cash; as a consequence, the use of currency rises. 
 
20
 The detailed analysis and tests can be found in the Appendix . 
 
21
 The existance of only one cointegration vector in our system means that there is a long-run equilibrium relationship 
between C, Y, TAX, R, and REM.  
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Given the non-stationarity of our series and the presence of a common stochastic trend, traditional 
estimation methods are ruled out. So, in order to estimate equation (2) and measure the size of the 
informal sector, we decided to tackle the problem using a vector error-correction model (VECM). 
This type of models present a series of improvements with respect to standard approaches, allowing 
us to analyse short and long-run effects.  
 
Examples of error correction models to measure informality can be found  in works by Bovi (1999), 
Bovi and Castellucci (2001) and, more recently, in Chiarini and Marzano (2004) with respect to 
Italy. 
 
The different VECM’s estimated in this paper can be defined as follows: 
 
tttt YYY    111                                                    (3) 
 
where Y is a vector formed by the n variables used in our currency demand model (i.e. C, Y, TAX, 
R and REM
22
).   and are 5x5 matrices made up by the system coefficients.  If the rank of 
cointegration r is less than n, then   = γβ’, where γ represents the adjustment coefficients and  β 
the cointegrating vectors. Finally, ε corresponds to our system residuals and δ is a constant term 
which can be separated in two parts ─a trend term and the intercept─ in the cointegrating relation. 
 
 
 
D. Results and Their Robustness 
 
In order to test the robustness of our model, we also estimate equation (2) without remittances, in 
addition, following Guissarri’s (1987) specification we estimate the model using government 
consumption normalized by GDP instead of tax burden and finally we use an approximation of the 
classical Tanzi (1983) model. The long-run cointegrating coefficients are reported in Table 1. 
 
As expected, in model (1), which corresponds to equation (2), the coefficients for output, tax burden 
and remittances have a positive long-run effect, while interest rates take the pressure off on 
currency demand. All coefficients are strongly significant and assign relevant weight to GDP with a 
coefficient of 0.76 and taxes with 0.49, while leaving a moderate but not negligible effect to 
remittances with a coefficient of 0.12. 
 
The performance of Model (2) is weaker compared to Model (1) and the TAX variable is barely 
significant; moreover it still retains significance among all its coefficients. On the other hand, 
Models (3) and (4) fail to maintain significance in all their variables except for taxes and interest 
rates .  
 
In Model (4) we are forced to approximate Tanzi’s original specification using only income per 
capita, taxes and interest rates in order to explain variations in the currency ratio (C/M2). This is  
mainly due to data constraints. Hence, we are not able to include the ratio of wages and salaries, as 
in the original specification. Nevertheless, the model can be used to measure the explanatory power 
of this type of specification for the Mexican context, and as we can see from Table 1, this type of 
modelling has very little explanatory power with respect to the currency ratio in the economy. 
Furthermore, the interest rates present a negative sign in the cointegrating coefficient (-0.34), which 
                                                 
22
 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank (2007), among others, address the 
issue of potential endogeneity of remittances. So, we include remittances in the set of endogenous variables.  
 
 9 
can be interpreted as having a positive effect on currency holdings, which is in contradiction with 
the economic theory. 
 
Table 1 
 
Normalized Cointegrating Coefficients
23
 
Model   (1)
a 
(2)
a 
    (3)
a 
                        
(4)
b 
Trace Statistic 5% 2 1 1 3 
  1% 1 0 0 1 
Max Eigenvalue 
Statistic 5% 1 0 0 1 
  1% 0 0 0 0 
Ct-1   1.00 1.00 1.00  
       
C/M2t-1      1.00 
       
Yt-1   -0.76*** -0.63*** -0.11  
   (0.04) (0.07) (0.18)  
Ypct-1      0.38 
      (2.20) 
TAXt-1   -0.49*** -0.44*  -12.61*** 
   (0.13) (0.28)  (3.78) 
Rt-1   0.09*** 0.18*** 0.22*** -0.34 
   (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.40) 
REMt-1   -0.12***    
   (0.03)    
GOVt-1     -0.03  
     (0.57)  
Cons   -2.75*** -6.97*** -23.39*** 23.87 
    (1.10) (2.15) (4.26) (23.44) 
Log Likelihood 191.85   180.73 189.64  136.17  
Χ2 673.99 141.17 21.42 11.19 
Note: All  series used in the models are I(1) .The complete details of the analysis as well as the  matrix of  
adjustment coefficients can be found in the appendix.   The number of lags in the models  were determined  
using the Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (SBIC) and the  
Hannan and Quinn information criterion (HQIC) . 
a.- Model was estimated using two lags 
b.- Model  was estimated using four lags                              
     All models we estimated assume one cointegrating equation. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
***indicates significance at the 1 percent level 
** indicates significance at the 5 percent level 
 *indicates significance at the 10 percent level  
 
                                                 
23
 All variables are in natural logs. In addition to the previously described variables in section C, we have: 
 C/M2: the ratio between currency outside the banks and M2 (broad money); 
 Gov: the ratio between government consumption and GDP; 
 Ypc: GDP per capita. 
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E. The Size of the Informal Sector 
 
After estimating the vector error correction model (VECM)
24
 and obtaining the coefficients for the 
long-run relationship of equation (2) reported as Model (1) in Table 1, we proceed to estimate the 
size of the informal economy.  
In order to obtain an estimate of the size of the informal sector, first, we compute Cˆ  using all the 
coefficients in equation (4). Then, we set the tax variable equal to zero and re-estimate the equation 
keeping all the other coefficients unchanged to obtain C
~
. 
 
Rem12.009.049.076.075.2  RTAXYC                                    (4) 
 
The difference between these two variables ─ Cˆ  and C
~
─ give us the amount of extra currency in 
the economy. Following Tanzi (1983), we assume equal velocity in both the formal and informal 
sector, and estimate it as follows: 
 
v
ECM
Y

1
                                                                     (5) 
 
Equation (5) yields the velocity of money in the Mexican economy. Y is the GDP, M1 corresponds 
to total currency and deposits in circulation, and EC stands for extra currency or illegal money.  
The difference between M1 and EC can be interpreted as the amount of legal money used in the 
economy. Once we estimate the velocity from equation (5), the size of the informal sector can be 
obtained multiplying EC  by the velocity of money: 
 
informal* YvEC                                                                   (6) 
 
Using equation (6), we can infer the size of the informal sector in formal GDP terms.  From Table 1 
we can also observe that our coefficient for Y  is different from 1. So, in the Ahumada et al. (2006) 
spirit, we proceed to correct our estimates using their suggested method
25
:  
 

1
formal
informal
1
formal
informal
formal
informal
ˆ
ˆ















Y
Y
C
C
Y
Y
                                                    (7) 
 
where Y and C are the GDP and money respectively, while β  is the income elasticity.  
The correction basically deflates the “wrong” ratio (Ŷinformal / Ŷformal ) that we obtained using 
inappropriately the assumption β = 1. Equation (7) corrects our estimates when β ≠ 1.  
Our original and corrected results normalized by the formal GDP are summarized below (see text 
figure). As we can see, informality in the 1990’s and early 2000’s stabilizes around 20-30 percent of  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24
 The long-run relationship between our variables was derived normalizing C. 
 
25
 Ahumada et al. (2006) show that it is wrong to assume the same velocity of money when the hypothesis β = 1 is 
rejected by the econometric estimation of the currency demand model. This is our case, since our model gives us a 
coefficient β = 0.76. 
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GDP, which is in line with previous studies
26
.The rest of the series, unfortunately, cannot be  
compared; so, inference should be taken with 
caution. Informality fluctuated between 50 and 
60 percent of GDP during the 1970’s and 
presents a huge jump in the 1980’s, reaching 
almost 85 percent of GDP in 1988. Although at 
first sight this magnitude could seem out of 
proportion,  we should clarify that this period 
was characterized by great economic and 
political turmoil in Mexico and the rest of  Latin 
America. Moreover, deep crises and 
hyperinflation affected the south of the continent, 
and Mexico registered inflation rates above 100 
percent (see Figure 2 in the Appendix).  
       
Mexican Informal Economy as percentage of real GDP 
 
 
 
Source: Authors calculations using the currency demand approach. 
 
So, in this period, inflation and macroeconomic instability clearly played a major role on currency  
demand. However, to which extent inflation or informality can explain this peak is difficult to 
assess. Inflation rates above 100 percent occurred in 1983, 1987 and 1988, while hyper-informality 
is registered in 1988 and 1989.  
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Figure 1 plots both formal and informal series in real terms. If we compare both series, the presence 
of a parallel economy in Mexico can be appreciated. This underground economy grew continuously 
during the early 1970’s and the late 1980’s, accounting on average for almost two thirds of GDP. 
Informality then fell abruptly in the early 1990’s and remained stable around one third of GDP until 
our days. 
 
                                                 
26
 See, for example, Vuletin (2006), Schneider (2002) and  Loayza (1997). 
Sources: International Financial Statistics (IMF) and authors 
calculations using the currency demand approach. 
Note: Both formal and informal GDP are in real terms (2000 =100), and 
the vertical axis corresponds to billions of Mexican pesos. 
 
Loayza (1997) 
Schneider (2002) 
Vuletin (2006) 
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F. Informal Sector and Economic Growth 
 
As we explain in the previous sections of the paper, one of the aims of this study is to estimate a 
series for the informal sector, in order to use it to establish its long-run relationship with economic 
growth. To do so, once we have our informal economy series we have decided to apply the general 
to specific approach
27
. This methodology starts by setting a large general model that encompasses 
many explanatory variables (the idea behind this is that the model will loss more explanatory power 
if relevant variables are omitted rather than if irrelevant variables are included) and slowly start 
eliminating variables with not significant coefficients until we reach a simpler, but more robust 
model. 
 
For this part of the study we use annual data starting in 1970 and going all the way until 2006. The 
sources are again the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators and the Mexican Central Bank (online) database.  
 
We start from an over-parameterized model and slowly pin down variables until we are left with the 
most significant model. Equation (8) describes the general economic growth model. In addition to 
the traditional variables we include the so called Parallel Economy (the informal sector). 
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            (8)  
 
where: 
 
 Y is real GDP per capita; 
 Trade corresponds to (Exp+Imp)/GDP; 
 Gov is Government consumption as percentage of GDP; 
 Pop indicates demographic developments; 
 PE is the parallel economy; 
 FDI corresponds to foreign direct investment as percentage of GDP. 
 
From equation (8) we are interested in obtaining a simpler model specification from which we can 
infer the long-run relationship between economic growth and parallel economies. 
 
The results from the various specifications are presented in Table 2. As expected, the initial model, 
specification (1), although presenting the highest R
2
, includes only two statistically significant 
variables, TRADE and Gov. So, we start eliminating variables whose coefficients are not significant 
and that we believe are not relevant for the long-run relationship between growth and informality. 
Therefore, in specification (3), we eliminate FDI and inflation, that we believe will have more 
impact in the short-run, indeed, we start getting significance for the Parallel economy variable (PEt-
1), the long-run coefficient 0.031 becomes significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
It is important to point out that trade and government consumption remain significant throughout all 
the models, highlighting their relevance for the Mexican economy. Going on, we arrive at 
specification (6), where all variables are significant and the parallel economy turns out to have a 
positive effect on economic growth. 
                                                 
27
 See for example Hendry (1995). 
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Table 2. 
Growth Regressions (ARDL Models) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Yt-1 -0.950 -0.167 -0.206* -0.243*** -0.260*** -0.260*** -0.242*** 
 (0.136) (0.126) (0.112) (0.075) (0.064) (0.062) (0.071) 
ΔPEt. -0.008 -0.007 0.001 -0.001 0.002   
  (0.020) (0.027) (0.019) (0.022) (0.018)   
PEt-1 0.002 0.023 0.031* 0.027 0.029* 0.029** 0.027* 
 (0.030) (0.023). (0.018) (0.021) (0.017) (0.014) (0.016) 
ΔTRADEt. -0.030 -0.055 -0.099 -0.109 -0.128 -0.128* -0.109 
  (0.106) (0.103) (0.087) (0.089) (0.078) (0.075) (0.081) 
TRADEt-1. 0.177*** 0.082* 0.076* 0.043*** 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.044** 
 (0.061) (0.049) (0.047) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) 
ΔGOVt. 0.112 0.138 0.170* 0.115 0.148 0.146* 0.117 
  (0.158) (0.137) (0.104) (0.119) (0.092) (0.084) (0.110) 
GOVt-1. 0.123* 0.142** 0.158*** 0.153** 0.168*** 0.168*** 0.152** 
 (0.066) (0.068) (0.060) (0.065) (0.051) (0.050) (0.064) 
ΔInflat. -0.007 -0.012  -0.008   -0.008 
  (0.011) (0.013)  (0.012)   (0.011) 
Inflat-1. -0.004 -0.002  -0.003   -0.003 
 (0.010) (0.012)  (0.006)   (0.006) 
.ΔPopt. 3.474 0.122 -0.639     
  (8.347) (9.203) (4.988)     
Popt-1. -0.154 -0.124 -0.100     
  (0.240) (0.233) (0.156)     
ΔFDIt. -0.015       
 (0.022)       
FDIt-1. -0.051       
 (0.030)       
Cons 4.110 3.937 3.840 2.330*** 2.484*** 2.493*** 2.322*** 
R
2
 0.602 0.535 0.522 0.521 .514 .514 .521 
RMSE 0.026 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.026 0.025 0.026 
     The regressions were estimated using annual data starting in 1970 until 2006. Robust Standard errors in parentheses. 
     ***indicates significance at the 1 percent level 
     ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level 
     *indicates significance at the 10 percent level  
 
 
So, using specification (6) we can derive the long-run relationship between the remaining variables 
and the Mexican economic growth. The long-run model is presented below as equation (9). 
 
 
                                          GOVTRADEPEY 64.019.011.059.29                                        (9) 
  
The former equation shows us the weights of each variable in the long-run and their effects on the 
Mexican economic growth.  We can see that Government consumption represents the biggest 
driving force of the Mexican economy, being almost 3 times higher than international trade.  
 
 
 
 
 
 14 
 
 
 
 
E.   Concluding Remarks 
 
 
The existence of a parallel economy in Mexico and other Latin American economies is well 
documented and accepted by the economic literature. It is the size and composition of this sector as 
well as the measuring methodology that are open to debate. In this paper, we used the currency 
demand approach to obtain a measure of informality in Mexico from the early 1970’s until 2006.  
 
Our results provide an example of the evolution of informality in a developing country. First, the 
underground economy in Mexico grows constantly during the 1970’s until it reaches its maximum 
in the late 1980’s. Then, it decreases sharply and stabilizes around 30 percent of GDP. This is not 
entirely good news. In a country with nearly 100 million inhabitants and 840 billion U.S. dollars of 
GDP, this amount of informality represents a huge weight on the formal establishment, creating 
negative externalities, anchoring the nation and precluding it from reaching its real economic 
potential. 
 
Furthermore, the stagnation of informality that characterized the past decade reflects the failure or 
lack of public policies targeting the informal sector, which consequently has left a large proportion 
of economic agents at the margins of the legal framework. Government lack of interest in this area 
will certainly have a deep impact and a huge cost on output in the long-run.   
 
So, it is imperative to elaborate long-term strategies, in order to help to channel informal agents and 
their economic flows ─i.e. remittances─ back to formality. The Mexican government should create 
the conditions in order to allow informal remittances and income to be converted into productive 
investment. Successful policies will alleviate pressure on public finances and formal establishments 
in the short-run, allowing the re-direction of new resources needed to finance growth. On the other 
hand, in the long-run, the entry of informal agents into the legal framework will add fair 
competitiveness to the markets rising salaries and production quality.  
 
Finally, Mexican policy makers should focus on the development of a slimmer regulation 
framework (i.e. less bureaucratic procedures, quick times and low costs, but above all less corrupt 
system), attractive enough to incentive effectively informal agents to come back to the formal 
economy.  
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Appendix Chapter I 
 
Data 
Variable Description Sources                                                                                               
C 
Natural logarithm of 
currency over GDP 
deflator. 
1970-2006 in national 
currency 
International Financial Statistics, 
(IMF), the series is also available 
entirely or partially at the Mexican 
Central Bank Web page 
(www.banxico.com) 
Y 
Natural logarithm of real 
GDP 
1970-2006 in national 
currency 
International Financial Statistics, 
(IMF), the series are also available 
at INEGI and Banxico’s web page. 
TAX 
Natural Logarithm of 1 + 
total of tax revenues over 
GDP 
1970-2006  
This series is partially available 
online, data before the late 1980’s 
are available only on paper records.  
The series used in this paper comes 
mainly from the Mexican Central 
Bank online database  
(www.banxico.com) 
Alternative Sources are: The 
Mexican Secretariat for Public 
Finance (SHCP), The National 
Statistics Institute (INEGI), and the 
Mexican Senate Economic Affairs 
Center. 
R 
Natural logarithm of the 
average of time deposit 
interest rates 
1970-2006 
This series was calculated using the 
CPP (costo porcentual promedio) 
that corresponds to the simple 
average of nominal interest rates. 
The registry of this type of index 
started in 1975, so the series was 
extended back to 1970. Sources: 
Mexican Central Bank, alternative 
source: Diario Oficial de la Nacion 
REM 
Natural logarithm of 
remittances normalized by 
GDP 
1970-2006 
World Development Indicators 
(World Bank) and Banxico. The 
series was used in national currency 
M1 
1970-2006 in local 
currency 
International Financial 
Statistics(IMF) and Banxico 
Inflation 1970-2006 
International Financial Statistics 
(IMF) 
Unemployment 
Rate of unemployment 
respect to Economic active 
population in urban areas 
1976-2006 
World Economic Outlook (IMF) and 
INEGI. 
Note: the first estimations were 
computed by INEGI using as sample 
only 3 major cities. Nowadays 
estimates are done in a much wider 
sample. 
Foreign Direct 
Investment 
FDI 
Net Inflows (BoP current 
US dollars) 
1970-2005 
World Development Indicators 
(World Bank) 
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Unit Root Tests 
 
 
 
Test Variables C Y TAX R REM 
Augmented 
Dickey-
Fuller
a 
Level -1.19 -2.35 -3.34** -0.84 -1.72 
First 
Difference -6.68*** -4.12*** -4.79*** -4.78*** -4.86*** 
Phillips-
Perron
a 
Level -1.04 -2.35 -2.65* -1.15 -1.52 
First 
Difference -6.72*** -4.12*** -4.77*** -4.77*** -4.91*** 
 
Augmented 
Dickey-
Fuller
b 
Level -2.12 -3.06 -2.47 -1.04 -0.77 
First 
Difference -6.57*** -4.35*** -4.73*** -5.08*** -3.58** 
Phillips-
Perron
b 
Level -2.14 -2.45 -2.63 -1.13 -1.11 
First 
Difference -6.61*** -4.36*** -4.69*** -5.08*** -4.92*** 
 
Augmented 
Dickey-
Fuller
c 
Level 1.87 6.24 0.49 -0.52 -1.04 
First 
Difference -6.09*** -2.54*** -4.81*** -4.83*** -4.93*** 
Phillips-
Perron
c 
Level 2.19 5.11 -0.44 -0.54 -1.13 
First 
Difference -6.09*** -2.40*** -4.80*** -4.83*** -4.98*** 
 
 
Above we present the test statistics for both the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and the Phillips-Perron tests. The lag length was chosen using the Schwarz 
Information Criterion. Null Hypothesis: variable has a unit root. 
Note: *** indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at 1 percent level.   
** indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at 5 percent level 
* indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at 10 percent level 
a.- test was conducted using an intercept 
b.- test was conducted using a trend and intercept 
c.- no trend nor intercept included 
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Cointegration Test 
 
 
 
Johansen Cointegration Test 
Null Hypothesis 
Alternative 
Hypothesis   
5% 
Critical 
Value 
1% Critical 
Value 
λtrace  tests  λtrace  value   
r = 0 r > 0 93.06 76.07 84.45 
r ≤ 1 r > 1 58.10 53.12 60.16 
r ≤ 2 r > 2 32.62 34.91 41.07 
r ≤ 3 r > 3 15.92 19.96 24.60 
r ≤ 4 r > 4 5.15 9.24 12.97 
λmax  tests  λmax value   
r = 0 r = 1 34.96 34.40 39.79 
r = 1 r = 2 25.47 28.14 33.24 
r = 2 r = 3 16.70 22.00 26.81 
r = 3 r = 4 10.77 15.67 20.20 
r = 4 r = 5 5.15 9.24 12.97 
Given the small size of our series we used a maximum of two lags running the tests. No deterministic trend. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Estimated Matrix of Adjustment coefficients 
ΔC ΔY ΔTAX ΔR ΔREM 
-0.99 -0.23 0.06 1.19 -0.44 
(0.17) (0.09) (0.34) (1.36) (0.75) 
             Standard errors in parentheses 
 
INEGI Survey  
Year 
Informal 
Sector 
2000 26.96 
2001 27.52 
2002 28.24 
2003 28.81 
2004 28.76 
2005 28.13 
2006 27.20 
                                                                                              Source: INEGI, Mexico. 
           Note: Annual Averages 
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Figure 2.   Inflation, Unemployment and Remittances in Mexico (1970-2006) 
Inflation, Unemployment and Remittances
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                              Sources: INEGI, International Financial Statistics (IMF), World Development Indicators (World Bank), Mexican  
            Central Bank (Banxico), INEGI. 
            Note: Right axis corresponds to inflation, both axis in percentage. Unemployment corresponds to the percentage 
             of Economic Active Population, while remittances are in percentage of GDP in national currency. 
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